Showing posts with label Lehman brothers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lehman brothers. Show all posts

Thursday, September 26, 2013

The Guy Who Predicted Lehman Brothers' Fall Sees Big Trouble Ahead for China

A Q&A with former Lehman Brothers VP Lawrence McDonald


Lawrence McDonald, author of the New York Times Bestseller "A Colossal Failure of Common Sense," gave International Business Times his views on the 2007 financial crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and where the next big downfall is going to come from.

What do you make of the news that Bank of America Corp. is being replaced in the Dow by Goldman Sachs?

The Dow is an interesting index; it has 30 large cap companies. I'm not sure what you can make out of that. Goldman's market cap right now is $77 billion and Bank of America's is $157 billion. So it's unclear why they did this. One reason could be, Bank of America have had an extremely volatile stock price in recent years. I mean, it's made a bunch of round trips. In 2011 it hit $5.03, in 2009 it hit $3.87. Five years ago today it was trading at around $40 at one point. So it's had multiple periods of volatility.

Also, there is no investment bank in the Dow. Bank of America is a commercial bank. There's a lot of talk about Glass-Steagall, I wrote about in my book. They may break up the big banks over the next year.

What would you characterize as the successes and failures of U.S. policy in the crisis aftermath?

Successes are getting the banks in a much healthier leverage and higher capital ratios. That's the biggest success by far.

The failure is, and there's a theme in my book about this, capitalism doesn't work without transparency of risk. And if you listen to what Sandy Weill said about that, it's "in a capitalist system, dollars are votes."

And when you can see the banks risk and see the risk on the balance sheets, that's transparent banking. Let's just say our dad gave us $200 million and we wanted to invest $10 million it in Citigroup. You wouldn't put that money in if you knew they were sitting on toxic assets, and if you can't see the toxic assets, then capitalism doesn't work.



All of my systemic risk indicators are clearly pointing at Asia. Asia is back where we were in 2007; they have a trillion dollars of toxic assets off the balance sheets -- hidden.

Where they've failed: Here we are five years later and there isn't a lot of transparency in terms of what is on the balance sheets, so you have trillions of bank deposits sitting on top of very opaque black box type investments. Whereas in the '60s, '70s, '80s and '90s, if you walked into Chase bank you knew they had deposits and they had real estate loans but they didn't have credit default swaps. Credit default swaps are still not on public exchanges.

So if you buy 100 shares of IBM, that's on the exchange and everyone can see it. If you buy a million shares of IBM, everyone can see that so everyone knows about that bet. If you buy $1 million worth of credit default swaps, that's still invisible. There's no public exchange.

When Lehman went down it had $8 trillion in credit default swaps, so that's $8 trillion of bets on different organizations that nobody knew about, and that's when credit in the U.S. froze. If you look at GE and Goldman -– they had to get a loan from [Warren] Buffet because nobody would loan any money to anybody because credit was frozen.

Going forward, what needs to change?

More transparency. The key is to either break the banks up or bring back Glass-Steagall. The current banks, if they are not broken up, must be much more transparent and show us what's on the balance sheets.

For example, when I sat down to write my book I talked to people who are paid $10 million a year to stay five or six steps ahead of the regulators. These guys' entire job is just to be ahead. You know, "what are the regulators gonna do next?" It's like chess. 

It doesn't matter what type of regulation you have, if the regulators don't have real experience on Wall Street, they can't execute.

Why, five years after Lehman, does most of what has happened in terms of regulation have to do with insider trading, which had nothing to do with the financial crisis? The financial protection bureau is consumed with these credit card bank fees. What's that got to with the financial crisis?

What they've done is: Dodd-Frank is like an eight-lane highway. Some cars are moving 10 mph and some are doing 90 mph, but the cars that are moving 90 mph are the least important to prevent another crisis and the cars that are moving 10 mph are the most important. That's the problem. They had a mandate to do something and they went to the low-hanging fruit.

Are we likely to repeat the mistakes that led to the last meltdown if there are people out there whose only job is to beat regulation?

There's no question that they've learned a lot, so you can say what you want about these guys trying to be five steps ahead, but they are not idiots and the banks are far better leveraged today.
The next financial crisis will not come from the United States. All of my systemic risk indicators are clearly pointing at Asia. Asia is back where we were in 2007; they have a trillion dollars of toxic assets off the balance sheets -- hidden. If you look at interbank lending, we meticulously measure every day how much banks trust each other, and that is a phenomenal leading indicator.

If you take summer 2011, the S&P dropped 20 percent in about 35-45 days. And sure enough, right before that, the interbank trust in Europe in May and June was completely breaking down because some banks in Europe, France and Germany own a lot of Greek bonds and the Greek bonds were in flames, dropping from 90, 70, 60, to 30, and there was hundreds of billions of these things and these losses needed to be borne back into the banks, so they banks were breaking down in terms of the trust.

And right before Lehman went down, five years ago in August 2008, interbank trust in the U.S. was almost gone. And if you meticulously track these indicators they will give you warning signs that the next elevator shaft is coming, and they are clearly pointing at Asia. It's mainly China. They've rallied in the last couple of weeks, but the bad real estate assets are adding to the 200 percent debt to GDP if you add the consumer debt. The U.S. has government debt and China has consumer and corporate debt. It's an unsustainable debacle coming.

They [China] are already trying to aggressively bail out out the banks. They are not letting them fail, they are lending them more money even though these banks have giant holes in their balance sheets, so essentially they are doing the same things as the U.S. [was] doing. Eventually that breaks. The government can only do so many things before the free market takes action. The good news is the Chinese banking system in the world is tiny relative to the U.S., so in other words, if you think of the U.S. banking system and everything in it, it's not as systemic. It will be a regional things and it will affect U.S. markets, but not in the same way as Lehman did.

What will happen to Fannie and Freddie in the future?

One theme that were seeing since Lehman is that politicians are making decisions that the free market used to make. So like when Lehman went down, Hank Paulson, as I said before, it is like a dictatorship where a small group of people are picking winners and losers. When GM went down, a small group of people were making decisions about who were the winners and losers. When Greece went down, the bondholders, same thing –- a small group of politicians that were picking winners and losers. And it's the same thing with Fannie and Freddie.

There is a bill to bring back and privatize Fannie and Freddie. Right now, 90 percent of all mortgages that are issued today will somehow be backed by either Fannie or Freddie. This is another ticking time bomb that won't be addressed because they don't want to rock the boat. So what's happening is, the U.S. taxpayer is getting longer and longer exposed to real estate.

In the '90s, Freddie and Fanie were only taking on 40 or 50 percent and the private sector was huge, but what's happened is the private sector market called securitization is really exploding on automobiles instead. It's actually working fine. Auto sales are up 15.7 million and securitization of auto loans is actually flourishing. So, if I'm a lender I can securitize those loans and sell them off to banks. I can take 1,000 auto loans and sell them to banks in China or in Europe.

Securitization in the mortgage space with home loans is not working, even five years after Lehman. And because of that every mortgage that is issued is a liability to the taxpayer, pretty much. If the bill succeeds it's going to create a super insurer.

In 2007, at least one and half times of economic growth was down to securitization. Now, a lot of those loans were good, but many were bad. Today not many of the goods ones are being done because Fannie and Freddie are broken and they haven't reformed. And that's a huge holdback.

The bottom line here is, it's holding back the U.S. economy because the U.S. economy doesn't have the securitization engine that the auto sales industry has. Auto sales are back above 2007 levels, but home sales are still down 60 percent and that's because there is no securitization in home lending.

Credits: Christopher Harress

Sunday, September 22, 2013

Lehman Was Not Alone – Measuring System Risk in the 2008 Crisis

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and ushered in the worst part of the recent financial crisis. Today, we still discuss whether taxpayer money should have been used to rescue Lehman. My colleagues at NYU and I have developed measures of systemic risk, and this fifth anniversary affords us a good opportunity to look at what these measures would have indicated to Treasury Secretary Paulsen if they had been available at that time.
The answer is quite surprising.
We estimate the amount of capital that a financial institution would have to raise in order to continue to function normally if we have another financial crisis like the one in 2008. This is interpreted as a capital cushion to protect against a decline of 40% in the broad equity market over the six months after this occurs. The rationale is that if all financial firms have an adequate capital cushion there cannot be a financial crisis. If one firm needs to raise capital under such circumstances, it is likely that the market can provide it or competitors can absorb its market share. But if many firms try to raise capital in the middle of a financial crisis, there is no source except the government.
We call this measure SRISK. We compute it weekly and post it on the website ‎systemicrisk. The estimation uses equity prices with methods that are extensions of the volatility models that formed the basis for my Nobel Prize. SRISK combines information on size, leverage, and risk to indicate how serious a default would be.
On the website, you can go back to August 29, 2008, to see the ranking of U.S. firms based on SRISK.  . Was Lehman at the top of the list in 2008? No. In fact, it was Number 11. The top of the list was Citigroup, which was estimated to need $139 billion. Following Citi, in order, were JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Freddie Mac, AIG, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, and Wachovia. Interestingly, all of these institutions were either nationalized or rescued, with the arguable exception of JPMorgan Chase.
We estimate that the first ten firms, excluding JP Morgan, needed about $700 billion in capital, which is the precise amount of the TARP request. At Number 11, the estimate is that Lehman would have needed $48 billion in capital. And it was allowed to go under. Interestingly, Washington Mutual, at Number 14, also was allowed to fail. 
Thus, the policies that were followed were quite in line with the SRISK measures. But is it enough to rescue only the Top 10 banks in a financial crisis? Where should we stop the bailouts?
The best answer is not to get in this situation in the first place. And that is why financial regulatory reform is so important.
Credit: Robert Engle 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Simon Johnson: The Problem of Too Big to Fail Is Even Bigger Than Before 2008

Editor's Note: Welcome to Crash Week! This week marks five years since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the financial crisis that followed. A lot has happened since then, but how much has changed? All week long we will be exploring this question from a variety of economic angles. Below is an interview with Institute Advisory Board member Simon Johnson on too big to fail and the debate over financial regulation. The interview originally appeared at Finanz und Wirtschaft. Stay tuned for more contributions from our grantees, community members, leaders, and other prominent economic thinkers!

Simon Johnson, Professor at MIT and former chief economist of the IMF, calls for much higher capital requirements for big banks.
Five years have passed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near meltdown of the global financial system. In various countries, a host of new regulations has been enacted to tighten the safety net in the global banking system. But Simon Johnson remains skeptical. The professor of economics at MIT and former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund warns that regulation such as the Basel III framework does not go far enough to effectively increase robustness in the financial system.
Professor Johnson, five years have passed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Is the financial system any safer today?

No, it is not structurally safer. The underlying incentives and rules have not changed, or not enough. It might be somewhat safer because people in financial markets got burned badly in 2008 and have become a little more cautious. But looking out five years, we should expect a repeat of the cycle and see something like that or even worse to happen again.
So, if a big bank failed today, the financial system would be in no better shape to handle it than five years ago?
It would of course depend on the exact circumstances, but there are certainly plenty of vulnerabilities out there.
Which vulnerabilities worry you the most?

The lack of equity capital in a lot of the big international banks. Second, they remain very big and intertwined across many jurisdictions, including but not only through derivatives. That makes any kind of near fail situations very difficult to handle. And as you know, there still is no crossborder framework for dealing with that. Third, there is still a lot of reliance on short term wholesale financing through money market funds. That was a big source of vulnerability in 2008, and that could come back to us again.
So the problem of too big to fail is still very much with us?
It is an even bigger problem than it was in the run up to 2007.
There was a vast regulatory response on global and national levels after Lehman. Why did that not succeed in making the financial system safer?

It is a combination of reasons. The key policy makers did not want to push too far in terms of reform. Perhaps it was because they did not believe in it and perhaps they thought it would slow down the recovery of the economy. Then of course the banking industry got back on its feet and the lobbying dollars became available again. The main industry strategy was simple: delay, delay, delay. Recognizing that the longer you delay things, the less likely they are to happen.
And they have been successful with that.

Oh yes, it is one of the best organized and financed lobbies we have seen in modern democracies.
What should have been done if we really had wanted to increase the robustness in the world financial system?

During the crisis, one or more of the big banks should have been taken through a resolution process and wound down. And when time came for reform, they should have broken up the big banks and introduced much higher capital requirements.
You mean a re-enactment of some kind of a Glass-Steagall Act?

You could do it through a Glass-Steagall or through a hard size cap on the balance sheet of the bank. Simply limit the size of the firms. In the United States, some combination of those would have been the right way to go.
The Basel III framework recommends higher capital requirements. Do they simply not go far enough?

Yes, absolutely. They do not go far enough by a long way. We have seen Sir John Vickers, chairman of the Independent Banking Commission in the UK, saying that we should move capital requirements to the region of 20% instead of 10%. And I think that would be the right direction. Basel III recommends 10%. But that is all on a risk-weighted basis, where a lot of funny accounting is going on. It is really not enough of a buffer against future losses.
Many countries are still debating on how and whether to introduce all the Basel-III recommendations. Would it be better to scrap the whole thing and start again?

Well, Europe is in trouble because they are still debating about Basel III. In the United States, the debate has already shifted to how far beyond Basel III we should go. That is the right approach. These big international negotiations take years and usually do not lead to very much. Every country should make its own decisions and take the necessary steps further to increase financial stability. It is a question of how much political courage the national regulators have.
How much equity capital should a globally active bank have? The economists Martin Hellwig and Anat Admati argue that we should be talking about 10 to 20% on an non-risk-weighted basis. Is that your view too?

Yes. Hellwig and Admati make a very strong case for higher capital requirements and much less leverage in bank balance sheets. They are very convincing.
The banks argue that equity is expensive, and that higher capital requirements will slow down the economy. What do you make of that?

The banks are lobbying and making these arguments up. There is no factual basis for their arguments. If you implement higher capital ratios the way it should be done, through retained earnings, you do not take anything away from the shareholders. It is a cushion against future losses, rather than have the taxpayer on the hook again. There are completely responsible ways to do this. And by the way, even Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, is quoted in the minutes of a Fed meeting that higher capital requirements do not slow down economic growth.
But if you split up, say, J. P. Morgan into ten smaller banks, they could still all serially fail in case disaster hits. What do you make of that argument?

Nobody is saying that there is one magic bullet. You want to have other safety mechanisms as well. The analysis actually says that you would create more shareholder value if you split up a bank like J. P. Morgan into different pieces. About the idea that they would all fail at the same moment: Yes, it is a theoretical possibility, but so is it theoretically possible that the world gets struck by a big meteor that would cause eternal winter.
The big universal banks argue that they have inherent diversification, which acts as a buffer against risk.

Again, that is an interesting theory. But what we have seen in Europe, where the universal banking model is prevalent, has actually been rather tragic for your economies. The universal banks did not diversify their risks, they used their size relative to the economy to take on more risk and concentrate that risk. And I think you would agree that there have been some spectacular bank failures in Europe and some situations where very large financial institutions needed a government bailout. The idea that the universal banking model protects you is a theory that is not supported by the facts.
Are banks in Europe even weaker than in the United States?

You have to be careful with comparisons between US GAAP and IFRS because of the way derivatives are accounted for. But if you look on an apples to apples basis, there are some big European players that have significantly lower capital levels than their US counterparts. The level in the US is not impressive and needs to be higher, but in Europe you have some very weak players, including most notably Deutsche Bank.
UBS and Credit Suisse count among the best-capitalized banks when looking at their core tier one ratio. But their leverage ratio is below 3%. Is the risk-weighted approach even something we should look at?

In some situations it can be informative, for example to the management of the bank. But it can also be highly misleading. All that we really know about risk weights is that in every crisis they are completely wrong. I am in favor of moving to regulating the leverage ratio. I am not saying the risk weighted approach has no information, but some very big mistakes have been made in risk-weighing the assets, also in the case of UBS.
So the Swiss should not feel too safe when we see our two big banks touting their high core tier one ratios?

The Swiss taxpayer should be pushing for much higher equity as reflected in a leverage ratio of six to ten per cent or even higher, if possible. You in Switzerland have a particularly extreme problem, as those two banks are huge in comparison to Swiss GDP. That is a big vulnerability, compared to any advanced economy. You need to be very careful when you allow these balance sheets to grow so big, because ultimately, that is an implicit liability for the Swiss tax payer should they get into trouble.
Why can we not just let banks go under and let the system cure itself?

You remember that idea was very influential in the early 1930s, when large numbers of banks in Europe and the US did fail. That helped cause the Great Depression. Since that time, we have recognized that there are big externalities we have to worry about. Having said that, I am very sympathetic that investors who have bought equity and bonds in such a bank should lose, and that management should lose too. We need to find a balance between making sure that you can fail and lose your investment, and preventing systemic panic. We have leant too far towards protecting investors and management, and that has created a much bigger moral hazard in recent years.

Credit: The Institute for New Economic Thinking