Showing posts with label FOMC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FOMC. Show all posts

Monday, November 4, 2013

3 Reasons Why USD Rallied after the FOMC Statement

Considering how the U.S. economy has more problems than a mathematics book, it was no surprise that the Federal Reserve decided against tapering stimulus in their monetary policy statement this week. But why the heck did the Greenback rally after the Fed announcement?! Here are three possible explanations:

1. No mention of the government shutdown or the debt ceiling


Perhaps the biggest issue that affected the U.S. economy this month was the government shutdown, which resulted to the temporary closure of non-essential services and furloughed employees. This shutdown lasted for more than a couple of weeks so it’s likely that overall economic activity took a hit.
However, the U.S. central bank seemed totally indifferent about the government shutdown, as Bernanke didn’t say whether it put a significant drag on economic growth or not. He didn’t even talk about the need to adjust their monetary policy stance because of this!

2. Less dovish economic outlook


What’s even more surprising is that, even with the slack in the jobs sector, Bernanke said that labor market conditions have improved. Really?!
A quick recap of the latest non-farm payrolls figures shows three consecutive months of subpar increases in hiring. Next week’s October NFP release is also projected to post weaker jobs growth of 120K, which would mark a steady decline in hiring since June this year.
Despite this, the Fed still believes that the economy is expanding at a moderate pace, similar to what they have been saying in their past rate statements. For now though, policymakers will continue to wait for more conclusive evidence that growth will carry on.

3. Fed didn’t postpone the taper


At the end of the day, Bernanke didn’t drop any hints on whether the taper will be pushed back a few more months or not. A few weeks ago, market watchers began speculating that March 2014 would be the earliest possible time when the Fed would start winding down its bond purchases. Further disappointments in U.S. data in the past few days led some to believe that the Fed wouldn’t start tapering until the second half of next year.
All Big Ben said was that the Fed would keep close tabs on incoming data, which means that U.S. economic releases could continue to spark a fundamental reaction from the Greenback in the coming weeks.
In a nutshell, the Greenback’s post-FOMC rally wasn’t really a result of what the Fed said but more of what they DIDN’T say. Those who were expecting to hear downbeat remarks or hints of a delayed taper were relieved to find out that the Fed wasn’t so pessimistic after all. In fact, some even started thinking that the Fed could start tapering this December! Do you think this is possible?
Credit: Piponomics

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

8 Things You Should Know About Janet Yellen

In a few hours, the White House is expected to announce the nomination ofJanet Yellen, currently the Vice Chairwoman of the Fed, as the next head of the Federal Reserve. Here are 8 things you probably didn’t know about Ben Bernanke’s likely successor.

1. If confirmed, Janet Yellen will be the first female Fed head in its 100-year history. 
She will also be the first Democrat to fill up the post since Paul Volcker left in 1987.

2. She specializes in inflation and unemployment issues. 
In 1996 she famously debated then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan over the right inflation target. She argued that an ultra-low inflation could harm the economy as much as high inflation could.
She also believes that the Fed should be more aggressive in bringing down unemployment since inflation isn’t likely to balloon given the current economic conditions.

3. She has the best track record in predicting growth, jobs, and inflation.
This isn’t surprising given the point above. A Wall Street Journal report tracked more than 700 predictions, speeches, and Congressional testimony made by 14 Fed policymakers from 2009 to 2012 and found that Yellen has produced the most accurate forecasts.

4. She has warned of the real estate bubble as early as 2005. 
Back when she was San Francisco Fed President Yellen gave a speech that warned that house prices are “abnormally high” and that there’s a “bubble element” even accounting for the factors that support the high prices. +1 for her forecasting scores!

5. She is one of the driving forces behind the Fed’s recent policy changes. 
According to the Fed’s transcripts, Yellen has been calling for aggressive stimulus measures since December last year. It wasn’t until a couple of months later that the Fed pledged to keep rates near zero with targets forinflation and unemployment.

6. She has experience in communicating the Fed’s plans to the public.
In 2010 Bernanke had asked Yellen to lead an internal communications committee that articulates the central bank’s goals to the public.
She also supports the Fed’s transparency, saying that “The effects of monetary policy depend critically on the public getting the message about what policy will do months or years in the future… I hope and trust that the days of ‘never explain, never excuse’ are gone for good.”

7. She prepares well for her meetings. 
Who doesn’t, right? However, more than a few Fed insiders have noted her thoroughness in her preparations. For example, back in April she had prepared a 20-page speech complete with 18 footnotes and 15 charts to argue the case for low interest rates. She’s also been known to speak concisely and directly.

8. She is married to a Nobel Laureate.
In 1978 she married George Ackerlof, who won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. Their dinner conversation would probably be like “How’s inflation these days, dear?” “It’s fine. We bought more bonds today. Please pass the salt.”
There you have it, folks! It looks like the next Fed head is all about inflation, unemployment, low interest rates, and girl power. In the wise words of Alicia Keys, “This girl is on fire!”
How do you think Yellen’s leadership will affect the Fed’s monetary policy and the U.S. dollar? Let us know by voting through the poll below!

Credit: Piponomics

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Simon Johnson: The Problem of Too Big to Fail Is Even Bigger Than Before 2008

Editor's Note: Welcome to Crash Week! This week marks five years since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the financial crisis that followed. A lot has happened since then, but how much has changed? All week long we will be exploring this question from a variety of economic angles. Below is an interview with Institute Advisory Board member Simon Johnson on too big to fail and the debate over financial regulation. The interview originally appeared at Finanz und Wirtschaft. Stay tuned for more contributions from our grantees, community members, leaders, and other prominent economic thinkers!

Simon Johnson, Professor at MIT and former chief economist of the IMF, calls for much higher capital requirements for big banks.
Five years have passed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near meltdown of the global financial system. In various countries, a host of new regulations has been enacted to tighten the safety net in the global banking system. But Simon Johnson remains skeptical. The professor of economics at MIT and former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund warns that regulation such as the Basel III framework does not go far enough to effectively increase robustness in the financial system.
Professor Johnson, five years have passed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Is the financial system any safer today?

No, it is not structurally safer. The underlying incentives and rules have not changed, or not enough. It might be somewhat safer because people in financial markets got burned badly in 2008 and have become a little more cautious. But looking out five years, we should expect a repeat of the cycle and see something like that or even worse to happen again.
So, if a big bank failed today, the financial system would be in no better shape to handle it than five years ago?
It would of course depend on the exact circumstances, but there are certainly plenty of vulnerabilities out there.
Which vulnerabilities worry you the most?

The lack of equity capital in a lot of the big international banks. Second, they remain very big and intertwined across many jurisdictions, including but not only through derivatives. That makes any kind of near fail situations very difficult to handle. And as you know, there still is no crossborder framework for dealing with that. Third, there is still a lot of reliance on short term wholesale financing through money market funds. That was a big source of vulnerability in 2008, and that could come back to us again.
So the problem of too big to fail is still very much with us?
It is an even bigger problem than it was in the run up to 2007.
There was a vast regulatory response on global and national levels after Lehman. Why did that not succeed in making the financial system safer?

It is a combination of reasons. The key policy makers did not want to push too far in terms of reform. Perhaps it was because they did not believe in it and perhaps they thought it would slow down the recovery of the economy. Then of course the banking industry got back on its feet and the lobbying dollars became available again. The main industry strategy was simple: delay, delay, delay. Recognizing that the longer you delay things, the less likely they are to happen.
And they have been successful with that.

Oh yes, it is one of the best organized and financed lobbies we have seen in modern democracies.
What should have been done if we really had wanted to increase the robustness in the world financial system?

During the crisis, one or more of the big banks should have been taken through a resolution process and wound down. And when time came for reform, they should have broken up the big banks and introduced much higher capital requirements.
You mean a re-enactment of some kind of a Glass-Steagall Act?

You could do it through a Glass-Steagall or through a hard size cap on the balance sheet of the bank. Simply limit the size of the firms. In the United States, some combination of those would have been the right way to go.
The Basel III framework recommends higher capital requirements. Do they simply not go far enough?

Yes, absolutely. They do not go far enough by a long way. We have seen Sir John Vickers, chairman of the Independent Banking Commission in the UK, saying that we should move capital requirements to the region of 20% instead of 10%. And I think that would be the right direction. Basel III recommends 10%. But that is all on a risk-weighted basis, where a lot of funny accounting is going on. It is really not enough of a buffer against future losses.
Many countries are still debating on how and whether to introduce all the Basel-III recommendations. Would it be better to scrap the whole thing and start again?

Well, Europe is in trouble because they are still debating about Basel III. In the United States, the debate has already shifted to how far beyond Basel III we should go. That is the right approach. These big international negotiations take years and usually do not lead to very much. Every country should make its own decisions and take the necessary steps further to increase financial stability. It is a question of how much political courage the national regulators have.
How much equity capital should a globally active bank have? The economists Martin Hellwig and Anat Admati argue that we should be talking about 10 to 20% on an non-risk-weighted basis. Is that your view too?

Yes. Hellwig and Admati make a very strong case for higher capital requirements and much less leverage in bank balance sheets. They are very convincing.
The banks argue that equity is expensive, and that higher capital requirements will slow down the economy. What do you make of that?

The banks are lobbying and making these arguments up. There is no factual basis for their arguments. If you implement higher capital ratios the way it should be done, through retained earnings, you do not take anything away from the shareholders. It is a cushion against future losses, rather than have the taxpayer on the hook again. There are completely responsible ways to do this. And by the way, even Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, is quoted in the minutes of a Fed meeting that higher capital requirements do not slow down economic growth.
But if you split up, say, J. P. Morgan into ten smaller banks, they could still all serially fail in case disaster hits. What do you make of that argument?

Nobody is saying that there is one magic bullet. You want to have other safety mechanisms as well. The analysis actually says that you would create more shareholder value if you split up a bank like J. P. Morgan into different pieces. About the idea that they would all fail at the same moment: Yes, it is a theoretical possibility, but so is it theoretically possible that the world gets struck by a big meteor that would cause eternal winter.
The big universal banks argue that they have inherent diversification, which acts as a buffer against risk.

Again, that is an interesting theory. But what we have seen in Europe, where the universal banking model is prevalent, has actually been rather tragic for your economies. The universal banks did not diversify their risks, they used their size relative to the economy to take on more risk and concentrate that risk. And I think you would agree that there have been some spectacular bank failures in Europe and some situations where very large financial institutions needed a government bailout. The idea that the universal banking model protects you is a theory that is not supported by the facts.
Are banks in Europe even weaker than in the United States?

You have to be careful with comparisons between US GAAP and IFRS because of the way derivatives are accounted for. But if you look on an apples to apples basis, there are some big European players that have significantly lower capital levels than their US counterparts. The level in the US is not impressive and needs to be higher, but in Europe you have some very weak players, including most notably Deutsche Bank.
UBS and Credit Suisse count among the best-capitalized banks when looking at their core tier one ratio. But their leverage ratio is below 3%. Is the risk-weighted approach even something we should look at?

In some situations it can be informative, for example to the management of the bank. But it can also be highly misleading. All that we really know about risk weights is that in every crisis they are completely wrong. I am in favor of moving to regulating the leverage ratio. I am not saying the risk weighted approach has no information, but some very big mistakes have been made in risk-weighing the assets, also in the case of UBS.
So the Swiss should not feel too safe when we see our two big banks touting their high core tier one ratios?

The Swiss taxpayer should be pushing for much higher equity as reflected in a leverage ratio of six to ten per cent or even higher, if possible. You in Switzerland have a particularly extreme problem, as those two banks are huge in comparison to Swiss GDP. That is a big vulnerability, compared to any advanced economy. You need to be very careful when you allow these balance sheets to grow so big, because ultimately, that is an implicit liability for the Swiss tax payer should they get into trouble.
Why can we not just let banks go under and let the system cure itself?

You remember that idea was very influential in the early 1930s, when large numbers of banks in Europe and the US did fail. That helped cause the Great Depression. Since that time, we have recognized that there are big externalities we have to worry about. Having said that, I am very sympathetic that investors who have bought equity and bonds in such a bank should lose, and that management should lose too. We need to find a balance between making sure that you can fail and lose your investment, and preventing systemic panic. We have leant too far towards protecting investors and management, and that has created a much bigger moral hazard in recent years.

Credit: The Institute for New Economic Thinking

PRESENTING: Your Ultimate Guide To The Most Anticipated Fed Announcement In Years !

On Wednesday, the Federal Reserve will conclude its two-day Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. And at 2:00 p.m. ET, it will publish its statement, which will conclude update information on the Fed's plans for monetary policy.
Everyone expects the Fed to keep its benchmark interest rate unchanged at near-0% (officially 0 to 0.25%)
But more importantly, most economists expect the Fed to finally announce that it is tapering its large-scale asset purchase program, which is informally known as quantitative easing (QE).
QE consists of the monthly purchase of $45 billion worth of Treasury bonds and $40 billion worth of mortgage bonds (MBS).  All of this has been intended to keep interest rates low to stimulate the economy.
And most economists expect the Fed to begin tapering it.

First, Remember What The Fed Said

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke began talking about tapering QE in late May. But the markets didn't really take him seriously until the June 19 FOMC press conference, which is when he presented a hypothetical roadmap for tapering QE to zero. From the transcript:
...Going forward, the economic outcomes that the Committee sees as most likely involve continuing gains in labor markets, supported by moderate growth that picks up over the next several quarters as the near-term restraint from fiscal policy and other headwinds diminishes. We also see inflation moving back toward our 2 percent objective over time. If the incoming data are broadly consistent with this forecast, the Committee currently anticipates that it would be appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of purchases later this year; and if the subsequent data remain broadly aligned with our current expectations for the economy, we would continue to reduce the pace of purchases in measured steps through the first half of next year, ending purchases around midyear. In this scenario, when asset purchases ultimately come to an end, the unemployment rate would likely be in the vicinity of 7 percent, with solid economic growth supporting further job gains, a substantial improvement from the 8.1 percent unemployment rate that prevailed when the Committee announced this program.
Most economists agree that we are on this track.

taper path
Societe Generale
From Societe Generale's Aneta Markowska
What Will The Taper Look Like

Ever since the Fed began signalling the taper could come in the Fall, economists have generally estimated that the size of the initial taper would be around $15 billion (i.e. reducing Treasury purchases by $10 billion and mortgage purchases by $5 billion).
However, with economic data falling short of expectations in recent weeks, many economists have reduced their initial taper estimates to between $5 billion and $10 billion total. (This is why we've been hearing a lot about "taper-light," "token taper," and "soft taper.")
Here's a round-up of some taper expectations from Wall Street's top economists:
  • Jan Hatzius, Goldman Sachs: $10 billion all in Treasuries
  • Vincent Reinhart, Morgan Stanley: $10 billion all in Treasuries
  • Aneta Markowska, Societe Generale: $10 billion all in Treasuries
  • Drew Matus, UBS: $7 billion in Treasuries, $3 billion in MBS
  • Joseph LaVorgna, Deutsche Bank: $10 billion in Treasuries, $5 billion in MBS
  • Michael Feroli, JP Morgan: $10 billion in Treasuries, $5 billion in MBS
  • Neal Soss, Credit Suisse: $10 billion in Treasuries, $10 billion in MBS
  • Michael Hanson, BAML: $10-$15 billion total, split evenly between Treasuries and MBS
  • Michael Gapen, Barclays: $15 billion total, split between Treasuries and MBS
"Regarding the composition of the taper, we assume that the Fed will taper both Treasury and agency MBS purchases," said Gapen. "Many on the committee believe MBS purchases are more beneficial than Treasury purchases, and a paper delivered at the 2013 Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole, WY, also reflects this view."

Why They MUST Taper Now

Most economists don't feel 100% confident that the economic data alone is robust enough to justify tapering QE already. Some have explicitly pointed to non-economic reasons why the Fed will taper.
One such reason is because volatility in the markets, the economy, and especially Washington D.C. is currently low and is likely to rise in coming weeks. Here's Credit Suisse's Soss:
...The reason is the calendar. If FOMC policymakers don’t begin tapering this month, the next opportunities are their October 29-30 and December 17-18 FOMC meetings.
October is likely to be right in the middle of the debt ceiling fight. In general, people think these fights will end without tearing the fabric apart, but then again, nearly everyone expects a heightened degree of contention and disharmony. Also, President Obama may announce a nominee for Bernanke’s successor in mid-to-late October. This would not be an ideal moment for the central bank to experiment with a potentially disruptive operational change.
The next opportunity after that is the December FOMC meeting. With only minor exceptions, Ben Bernanke has been on a one-way easing street for over six years, beginning back in the summer of 2007. Does he really want his last holiday present to the nation and world economies to be a potentially negative shock?
Still, not everyone agrees we'll hear about the taper on Wednesday.

Why They Might Taper Later: The Economic Forecasts

Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Michael Hanson is one of the very few economists who's betting the taper won't be announced on Wednesday.
"We see a very close call, with a higher probability of tapering later this year (our base case is December) than at the September meeting," said Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Michael Hanson.
"While we expect the Fed to taper at one of the next three FOMC meetings, we see good reasons to be patient: recent data have, on balance, underperformed; the Fed needs to reduce its over-optimistic forecasts; and downside risks have re-emerged."
When the Fed publishes its FOMC statement, it will also update its economic forecasts (which Hanson mentioned above). Almost everyone expects the Fed's numbers to be revised downward.

What If Tapering QE Was A Mistake?

There's always the risk that interest rates begin to rise at a rate that puts the U.S. economic recovery at risk again.
But the Fed still has "heavy-caliber ammunition in reserve" for such a scenario. Here's Morgan Stanley's Reinhart:
...True, Fed officials have used QE in the past to signal the Fed’s willingness to keep policy accommodative for a considerable period. But that was then. Now they can signal the intent to keep policy accommodative—the forward guidance so much in vogue among central bankers—by adjusting their threshold on unemployment or introducing a lower bound on inflation. With this heavy-caliber ammunition in reserve in the event yields back up uncomfortably later in the year, they can put QE on the road to retirement. For the incumbents at the Fed, starting now puts a body in motion that will stay in motion for the next leader.
Regarding "forward guidance," the Fed employs an unemployment rate threshold of 6.5% and an inflation rate threshold of 2.5% to help guide monetary policy. In other words, as long as unemployment stays high and prices remain low, the Fed will continue to do what it can to keep rates low.

About Forward Guidance

Some economists believe the Fed could make an adjustment to its forward guidance on Wednesday. The Fed could conceivably offer a lower bound to its inflation rate threshold (e.g. not raising its benchmark rate as long as the inflation rate is below 1.5%).
It could possibly enhance its unemployment rate threshold by adding other qualifiers.
"One option... is to qualify the 6.5% unemployment rate threshold with participation rate or employment- to-population ratio variables," said JP Morgan's Feroli.
However, Feroli warns that it could be dangerous to adjust the unemployment rate threshold itself. Here's Feroli:
We think this is inadvisable, and we don't think the Committee will choose this option. While lowering the unemployment threshold would push back market expectations of the first rate hike, it also comes with some problems. First, as mentioned in the last minutes, it risks creating the impression that the threshold can be adjusted up, as well as down, which would defeat the whole purpose of the threshold as a form of commitment. Second, six Committee participants believe the natural unemployment rate is 5.8% or higher. These participants would likely view lowering the threshold as particularly risky, and would likely increase the number of dissents. Thresholds are only an effective communication device when they are viewed by the public as representing a committee consensus, thus more dissents could actually make this move counter-productive, particularly at a time when prospective Committee turnover is quite high. Third, lowering the threshold would provide additional easing, rather than merely reinforce communications regarding existing policy. Easing and reducing easing (through tapering) at the same meeting makes sense if the Fed explicitly admits that their thinking on asset purchases was faulty -- and the Fed rarely likes to admit their previous thinking may have been flawed. Finally, lowering the threshold does nothing to address what the FOMC is seeing as the emerging communication challenge: guiding expectations for the path of policy rates after the point of lift-off.
Feroli echoes a concern that the Fed knows about. From the July 30-31 FOMC Minutes:
...In general, there was support for maintaining the current numerical thresholds in the forward guidance. A few participants expressed concern that a decision to lower the unemployment threshold could potentially lead the public to view the unemployment threshold as a policy variable that could not only be moved down but also up, thereby calling into question the credibility of the thresholds and undermining their effectiveness. Nonetheless, several participants were willing to contemplate lowering the unemployment threshold if additional accommodation were to become necessary or if the Committee wanted to adjust the mix of policy tools used to provide the appropriate level of accommodation....
Any mention of forward guidance will likely come during the Fed's press conference at 2:30 p.m. ET.
Credit: Sam Ro